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ABSTRACT
A Study On Effects Of Data Poisoning On HMMs
by Rachel Gonsalves
With the ever increasing use of burgeoning volumes of data, machine learning
systems involving minimal human oversight are crucial for classification and analysis
tasks. Machine learning algorithms used for such purposes have revolutionized the
way we sort, classify, and analyze data.
The accuracy of any machine learning algorithm depends heavily on the data it
is trained on. In some circumstances, an attacker can attempt to poison the training
data to subvert a machine learning system. In this research, we analyze the effects of
training data poisoning attacks on hidden Markov models (HMMs), in the context of
malware classification. With the increase in percentage of data poisoning, HMM is
still able to classify most files correctly. Hence we find that HMMs are able to classify
at high and low level of poisoning.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
With the sheer rise in the amount and variety of data being generated, it has
become crucial that we have techniques to classify data independent of human
supervision. Machine learning techniques prove useful not only in classifying data but
also in identifying malware. Malware can affect computers, leak sensitive data [1],
cause denial of service attacks and cause much damage to crucial systems in the
current world. Many machine learning techniques are being used today to detect
malware and prevent attacks. In order to escape detection and carry out attacks
successfully, attackers come up with innovative ideas; one such idea is to compromise
the training data of a machine learning model, which causes incorrect learning and
thus confuses the model and leads to decreased accuracy but with higher and lower
levls of posoinonig the model still [2].
The attacks that involve influencing the models can be categorized as [3]:
• Causative
• Exploratory
Figure 1: Poisoning of Training Set
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The accuracy and efficiency of a machine learning algorithm depends on the
training data. When the training set for a machine learning algorithm is poisoned,
such an attack is called a causative attack. [3]. Poisoning a model slowly over a
period of time is called the Boiling Frog attack [2]. Figure 1 describes how an
attack on the training set works [3]. 𝑃𝑧 indicates the true distribution. 𝐷𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛 and
𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙 represent the training and testing set respectively. 𝐻 is the machine learning
algorithm.𝑓 is the hypothesis that is evaluated by comparing the results. An example
of a causative attack against a spam filter is described as follows in [4]: Attackers
try and circumvent spam filter re-training by sending non-intrusive traffic, carefully
constructed to resemble the upcoming spam. This causes the defending filter to be
mis-trained which results in an inability to effectively block the spam. This would
be as follows: the spam sales pitch "You need a new phone? Really, do buy now!"
is recast as "Do you really need buy a new phone, now!?"; while both these phrases
have markedly different meanings they are treated the same by the spam filter. [4] In
an exploratory attack, the attacker observes the effects of instances designed for the
learning model but does not directly influence the learning [5] [2].
The goal of a malware detector is to ensure secure learning [3]. In the current
experiment, we check how susceptible HMMs are to data poisoning. For a given
training set, when data is poisoned, the model is tested on a benign and malware test
data. When the model training set is poisoned, we quantify the change in performance
of the model.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Relevant background topics
are discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter includes an introduction to Hidden Markov
Models(HMMs), on which our training and testing methods and some related work.
In Chapter 3, we discuss the implementation, present the results and observations.




2.1 Hidden Markov Model
Hidden Markov model is a machine learning technique which is used for statistical
pattern analysis [6]. To get a deeper understanding of the concept and an overview of
the terminology used, we look at an example from the paper ’A Revealing Introduction
to Hidden Markov Models’ [7] and understand the terminologies. Suppose we want to
predict the temperatures of some 100 years ago and know that relation between the
size of growth of tree rings and the weather. The weather is categorized to hot(H)
and cold(C). The sizes of tree rings to small(S), medium(M) and large(L). Given an
observation of tree ring sizes we try to find whether it was hot or cold during the
growth of the ring. These states are unknown thus known as hidden states. The
model is represented by observation matrix, transition matrix and the initial state
distribution.
The transition matrix 𝐴 is a 𝑁 * 𝑁 matrix where is 𝑁 is the number of
states, observation matrix is 𝑁 *𝑀 where M is the number of observed symbols.
Initial state distribution is the probability of starting at any given state and is
give by a list of size 𝑁 , these represent probabilities corresponding to each state.
Each matrix is row stochastic. In the Figure 2 [7], 𝑋0−𝑋𝑛 represents the hidden states.
𝑇 = length of the observation sequence
𝑁 = number of states in the model
𝑀 = number of observation symbols
𝑄 = 𝑞0, 𝑞1, ..., 𝑞𝑁−1 = distinct states of the Markov process
𝑉 = 0, 1, ...,𝑀 − 1 = set of possible observations
𝐴 = state transition probabilities
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𝐵 = observation probability matrix
𝜋 = initial state distribution
𝑂 = (𝑂0, 𝑂1, ..., 𝑂𝑇−1) = observation sequence.
Figure 2: Hidden Markov Model
HMM is used to solve mainly three problems:
Problem 1: Given a sequence of observation to find the probability of the observed
sequence
Problem 2: Finding the state sequence that best fits the given model.
Problem 3: To find a model that fits best the observed data [7].
2.2 Hidden Markov Model for Malware Detection
For malware classification in HMM, the model is trained on the opcode sequence
of the malware. This type of analysis is known as static analysis because it does not
involve execution and monitoring [8]. Malware detection with the help of HMM is
statistical as it trains on statistical features [9].
2.3 ROC Curves
For Receiver Operating Classifier(ROC) curves, we need to calculate the True
Positive Rate(TPR) and False Positive Rate(FPR).For a given classifier, we need
to understand that samples can be classified in 4 ways [10]. When a given malware
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sample is correctly classified as malware, it is considered to be a true positive. When
a malware sample is classified as benign it is a false negative. When a sample is
benign and classified as benign it is a true negative.When a benign sample is wrongly
classified as malware it is False Positive. TPR is the total number of true positives
upon the total number of positive samples, TPR also termed as the sensitivity [11]. A
True Negative Rate(TNR) is the total number of true negatives up the total number
of benign samples and is known as the specificity. [12]. The x-axis of the ROC curve
represents the FPR and y-axis represents the TPR. The threshold passes through the
point (TPR,FPR) [10].
2.4 Related Work
When it comes to data poisoning, a lot of work has been done to observe its
effects on various machine learning techniques. Data poisoning attacks mostly occur
when a system is adaptive [13]. It is also most common when data is gathered from
unreliable sources. One of the methods used to improve the efficiency and decrease the
model vulnerability is that the model can be trained to reject a sample which causes a
decrease in efficiency. The sample would be considered as an outlier. This technique
is also known as Reject On Negative Impact(RONI) or data sanitization [14] [13].
Blacklisting and white listing sources requires a lot of effort and it also blocks some
good traffic. This does not prove to be effective in the long run either [15]. Another
method, weighted bagging, was used for the training data; this helps make the model
robust against such attacks [16] [5] . The concepts of data sanitization, weighted
bagging and defining upper and lower bounds for testing data are useful when dealing





Hidden Markov models are useful in classification of malware. HMM is used to
distinguish between malware and benign files. [7] For the detection of malware, the
model is trained on the opcode sequence. This trained model is tested on opcode
sequence of benign files as well as malware. For the purpose of this experiment, the
HMM is trained on 100 files each of 3 malware families. The 𝐴, 𝐵 and 𝜋 matrix are
initalized to around 1/𝑁 , 1/𝑀 and 1/𝑁 per row respectively. The 26 most frequently
occuring opcodes were mapped and the rest were considered to be space. For the
current model the values were initialized as follows: 𝑁 = 2, 𝑀 = 27. 𝑀 is 27 for the
number of opcodes and space inserted for every opcode not in the 26. N is 2 as it gave
the best classification after experimenting with N ranging 2 to 6. For each training
100 files are used.
3.2 Dataset
In order to test the effects of data poisoning on the model, the model was initially
trained on a pure training set so the changes in the efficiency of the model can be
observed once the data is poisoned. For the purpose of this experiment, malware files
from the Malicia dataset were used. The model was trained on 3 malware families
based on the number of samples available in the training set: Winwebsec [19], Zbot [20]
and Zeroaccess [21].
For each malware family, the training set and test set contained 100 files. Once the
model was trained and tested, the data was poisoned gradually by adding files one by
one to the training set, training and then testing the model. The decrease in efficiency
of the model is checked by evaluating the Area Under the Curve (AUC).
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3.3 Tests
This section includes the results of data poisoning on 3 malware families.
100 files from each malware family were selected randomly. For the purpose of
testing, a sequence with 𝑇 = 15000 was used from each sample file to score the samples.
3.3.1 Effects of Data Poisoning on Winwebsec
The model was trained on 100 files from the Winwebsec malware family, and
tested on 100 samples of malware and benign files, the training data was poisoned with
the addition of one malware file and was tested again. From Figure 3 to Figure A.27,
we see the scatter plots and ROC curve of the tested data. In the results we see that
the AUC of the model decreases with addition of each benign sample. In the pure
training set, an AUC of 0.64 is observed 3, which gradually goes to 0.95 A.22 with a
data poisoning of 45%
7
Figure 3: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with Pure Dataset
8
Figure 4: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for with Pure Dataset
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3.3.2 Effects of Data Poisoning ZeroAccess
The model was trained on 100 files from the ZeroAccess malware family, and
tested on 100 samples of malware and benign files, the training data was poisoned with
the addition of one benign file after each test and was tested again. From Figure 5
to Figure A.41, we see the scatter plots and ROC curve of the tested data. The
results were evident as we see that the AUC of the model decreases with addition of
each benign sample. The results were evident as we see that the AUC of the model
decreases with addition of each benign sample. In the pure training set, an AUC of
0.93 is observed Figure 5, which gradually reduces to 0.19 which can be reversed to
an auc of 0.81 Figure A.40 with a data poisoning of 45%
Figure 5: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with Pure Dataset
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Figure 6: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for with Pure Dataset
3.3.3 Effects of Data Poisoning on Zbot
The model was trained on 100 files from the Zbot malware family, and tested
on 100 samples of malware and benign files, the training data was poisoned with
the addition of one benign file at a time and was tested again. From Figure 7 to
Figure A.63, we see the scatter plots and ROC curve of the tested data. In the results
we see that the AUC of the model does not decreaset with addition of each benign
sample. In the pure training set, an AUC of 0.71 is observed Figure 7, which gradually
increaseses to 0.79 Figure A.58 with a data poisoning of 45%
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Figure 7: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with Pure Dataset
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Figure 8: Zbot Scatter Plot for with Pure Dataset
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3.3.4 Results for All Malware Families
The following Figure 9 is a graphical representation of the change in AUC with the
increase in percentage of data poisoning for all malware families.The x axis represents
the AUC and the y axis represents the percentage of data poisoning.
Figure 9: Effects of Data Poisoning on All Malware Families
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CHAPTER 4
Conclusion and Future work
4.1 Conclusion
HMM was trained on three malware families, these trained models were tested
on malware and benign samples. The models trained on pure datasets performed well.
Multiple HMM models were trained with training data poisoned from 0% to 45% for
each family incrementing the poisoning by 5. As the percentage of poisoning increased,
the model was still able to classify the files at a higher and lower level of poisnoning.
4.2 Future Work
HMMs trained on API calls as features are stronger and hence it would be a good
comparison to see how HMMs trained dynamically perform with this type of an attack
15
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A.1 Graphs for Data Poisoning on Winwebsec
Figure A.10: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with 5% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.11: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for 5% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.12: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with 10% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.13: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for 10% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.14: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with 15% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.15: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for 15% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.16: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with 20% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.17: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for 20% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.18: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with 25% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.19: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for 25% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.20: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with 30% Data Poisoning
28
Figure A.21: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for 30% Data Poisoning
29
Figure A.22: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with 35% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.23: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for 35% Data Poisoning
31
Figure A.24: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with 40% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.25: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for 40% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.26: Winwebsec ROC Curve and AUC with 45% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.27: Winwebsec Scatter Plot for 45% Data Poisoning
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A.2 Graphs for Data Poisoning on ZeroAccess
Figure A.28: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with 5% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.29: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for 5% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.30: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with 10% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.31: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for 10% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.32: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with 15% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.33: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for 15% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.34: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with 20% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.35: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for 20% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.36: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with 25% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.37: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for 25% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.38: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with 30% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.39: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for 30% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.40: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with 35% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.41: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for 35% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.42: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with 40% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.43: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for 40% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.44: ZeroAccess ROC Curve and AUC with 45% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.45: ZeroAccess Scatter Plot for 45% Data Poisoning
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A.3 Graphs for Data Poisoning on Zbot
Figure A.46: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with 5% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.47: Zbot Scatter Plot for 5% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.48: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with 10% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.49: Zbot Scatter Plot for 10% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.50: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with 15% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.51: Zbot Scatter Plot for 15% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.52: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with 20% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.53: Zbot Scatter Plot for 20% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.54: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with 25% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.55: Zbot Scatter Plot for 25% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.56: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with 30% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.57: Zbot Scatter Plot for 30% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.58: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with 35% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.59: Zbot Scatter Plot for 35% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.60: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with 40% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.61: Zbot Scatter Plot for 40% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.62: Zbot ROC Curve and AUC with 45% Data Poisoning
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Figure A.63: Zbot Scatter Plot for 35% Data Poisoning
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